PAC: ERAS Study Proposal (PAC-2023-1) (20241206)

The Missouri Joint Municipal Electric Utility Commission d/b/a Missouri Electric Commission fully supports and is in favor of MISO's ERAS proposal as presented at the ERAS Workshop on December 6, 2024. 

The Alliance for Affordable Energy (AAE), member of the public consumer advocate sector and consumer advocate for Louisiana ratepayers does not support the proposed MISO Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS). This feedback is in response to the December 6th ERAS Proposal Workshop. AAE has the following concerns regarding the ERAS proposal.

The Alliance for Affordable Energy ERAS Proposal Concerns:

1. Speed of MISO ERAS Proposal. The MISO ERAS proposal timeline from introduction to FERC approval is from mid-November 2024 - February 2025 - while there has been opportunity for stakeholder feedback, MISO did not complete review of stakeholder comments before the second workshop. This process has moved very quickly and the Alliance is concerned about what an expedited timeline implies - a lack of time to integrate stakeholder concerns into a final proposal, and to fully investigate how such a proposal will degrade the already challenged interconnection queue, and limit access to affordable energy resources for residential ratepayers.

2. ERAS Sunset. The current 3 year sunset timeline is too open-ended.  AAE is not supportive of the ERAS proposal functioning as an expedited queue for 3 years. It is worth noting that other leading RTOs - PJM and SPP are considering a 1 time study for their equivalent ERAS proposal. MISO should look to SPP and PJM and also adopt a 1 time study format. AAE understands resource adequacy concerns, however the regular queue issues must be addressed by MISO, and can not rely on a fast-track process that might favor certain resources and potentially Load Serving Entities over other developers. The MISO queue issues must be addressed. Consumers can not be made to wait years for MISO to fix the interconnection process and in the meantime create a process that advantages applications for approvals of resources in state processes without that state approval.  AAE supports a 1 time study cycle to address immediate resource adequacy concerns, but does not support multiple study cycles. 

3. Resource agnosticism. The ERAS proposal will likely result in additional Natural Gas fired generation, which in time will likely become stranded assets given the nature of shorter term contracts with the majority of load additions related to data centers, which would further saddle consumers with costly rate impacts. Consumers will have to pay for the net of contracts for generation resources built to meet shorter-term resource adequacy needs. It is a basic truth that generation receiving GIA’s through the ERAS process will have an advantage over generation in the regular queue, since that is the purpose of ERAS. This will result in inherent discrimination where gas resources are selected based on what’s in a state generation application, rather than based on resource adequacy criteria. This is a challenge especially with regards to generation for data centers (such as gas fired generation to meet resource needs for the Meta data center in North Louisiana currently being considered at the state commission). If such data centers experience reduced demand due to technological advancements, or if data centers move to other states, consumers will be left to pay for a costly resource no longer needed to meet their regional resource needs.

4. Unequal treatment of participants who have dutifully followed the traditional interconnection process creates unequal consumer outcomes. The ERAS proposal creates a limited pool of resources. Additionally the ERAS proposal does not address the root cause of delayed commercial operation dates such as supply chain bottlenecks etc. There is ample generation cleared from the queues, as well as in the queues to fill resource adequacy needs, but MISO must focus on the root causes of delays in getting generation online. MISO should focus on internal improvements and increased coordination between TO’s and interconnection customers to resolve delays. The current interconnection process must be streamlined. MISO is working to improve the process, however, a fast-track for resources to skip the regular queue is a step backwards. Creating a wholly new interconnection system that might potentially favor certain resources does not address the systemic problems which have created the interconnection queue issues to begin with. 

The Alliance for Affordable Energy recognizes the importance of meeting resource adequacy requirements, while also balancing affordability for consumers today and into the future. AAE hopes that MISO staff will create a proposal that will allow ample time for stakeholder analysis and feedback, and create an intermediary interconnection process that is truly resource agnostic and considers short-term and long-term ratepayer impacts. Thank you for the opportunity to provide feedback. 

Based upon the comments and presentations from MISO leadership at the Quarterly Board Meeting in Texas, and on Aubrey Johnson’s December 9, 2024 Post-Technical Conference Remarks to FERC^[1] (hereinafter, “Remarks to FERC”), it is clear to the Environmental Sector that MISO fully intends to proceed with its Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) proposal. While we maintain our position that MISO has not adequately justified the need for ERAS in light of other avenues of resource accreditation relief,^[2] we focus within this feedback on the new information provided during MISO’s second ERAS Workshop on December 6, 2024, and on further opportunities to improve the ERAS proposal.

We also highlight that in those same Remarks to FERC, but with respect to co-location of generation with large load, Mr. Johnson states, “. . . it is important to note that within MISO, approximately 56 gigawatts of new generation has completed the generator interconnection study process and has executed interconnection agreements. This significant amount of generation could be available (without any delays due to interconnection studies) to serve the large load additions that may otherwise rely on co-location.” We agree that this generation, which represents more than 26 GW of accredited capacity, could become available to serve large load additions, and other load as well, thus our continued dissatisfaction with MISO’s limited showing for the need for ERAS.^[3] MISO’s problem is not that it can’t get projects with signed GIAs–it's that it can’t get those projects to commercial operation. Thus, we still don’t see how ERAS projects with signed GIAs will be able to begin service any more quickly than non-ERAS projects with signed GIAs. In that regard, we offer suggestions in the “Eligibility” section below for how MISO could provide stricter entry requirements for ERAS projects to ensure they can begin to serve MISO’s capacity with a more certain and rapid timeline. Suggestions aside, it seems to us that ERAS is a solution in search of a problem, and in this case it seems like a solution being proposed in the name of “doing something” as opposed to a solution for the actual problem we face today.

Eligibility

We appreciate that ERAS eligibility has been expanded from LSEs only to “LSEs and other ICs, where applicable” as this may begin to address anti-competitive aspects of ERAS. However, we need more details as to what “where applicable” means for other ICs. Examples would help. Indeed, MISO has stated elsewhere, specifically in the December 16th OMS meeting, that it continues to view the LSE’s as the “right gate” for entry into ERAS. To the extent that eligibility is set up in such a way as to severely limit the ability of other ICs (that is, merchant project developers) to participate in ERAS, to what extent is MISO concerned about possible anti-competitive impacts that ERAS may incur within its market? And while we do support this expansion of eligibility if ERAS moves forward, all ERAS projects should still have strict eligibility requirements to ensure they are well along in the development process and can meet their commercial operation dates without delay. Thus far, ERAS is only designed to increase the number of projects with signed GIAs, not to increase the number of projects that actually become operational in the 3-5 year time frame contemplated in the second workshop. Increased readiness requirements, and financial incentives, such as automatic withdrawal penalties, and higher milestone payments as were included in our November 29th comments should be in place to limit eligibility for ERAS and ensure any projects that do qualify can be in service within 5 years.

Commercial Operation Date

Noting that in our first round of feedback we sought a 2-3 year timeframe for ERAS projects, we seek clarity on whether MISO proposes that ERAS projects will need to be commercially operational within 3-5 years or within 3-6 years, and we take umbrage with the messaging that MISO has exhibited related to this point. During the second ERAS Workshop, MISO suggested that the 3-5 year timeframe (as stated on the slides) may be extended to 3-6 years. Then in Mr. Johnson’s Remarks to FERC one business day later, he stated that the timeframe would in fact be 3-6 years.^[4] However, one day after that on December 10, MISO informed the Board of Directors System Planning Committee that ERAS projects must be commercially operational within 3-5 years.^[5] We are concerned that the Board might be hearing 3-5 years while MISO is telling FERC 3-6 years. Furthermore, if MISO is correct that ERAS is necessary to bring on capacity resources sooner than is possible with its standard interconnection process, then extending commercial operation dates to six years undermines the urgency MISO insists exists to meet resource adequacy challenges.^[6] At best, this inconsistency and apparent confusion in messaging shows that MISO is moving too fast in pushing ERAS forward and we thus urge MISO to exhibit much greater caution in moving too expeditiously in this endeavor.

In addition, the 3-5 year timeframe, including any possible extension to 6 years, contradicts the rationale for the proposal as explained at the December 16th OMS meeting. MISO stated in that meeting that ERAS was intended for projects that will definitely come online, not projects that are not yet in development. A timeline of more than three years leaves the door open to projects that are far earlier in their development than even projects in the current generation interconnection queue. Considering again MISO’s multiple statements indicating that ERAS would not be needed but for the 56GW of delayed projects that currently have signed GIAs, we can’t help but wonder why a three to five (or six!) year deadline for commercial operation could not otherwise be met by those 56GW of delayed projects, or by a large number of projects still in the queue with planned commercial operation dates within that same timeframe.

Harm

At the December 6th workshop, MISO claimed that ERAS would not cause harm to interconnection customers in the standard queue process because the two studies would be using the same base models. We request that MISO provide much more evidence to address the extent to which others already in the queue will or will not be harmed. We believe ERAS studies and resources will likely increase interconnection costs and cause further delay and uncertainty for already-queued resources, and may also shift costs to load via annual MTEP reliability studies.  

MISO proposes an ongoing and pervasive process, rather than a narrow, time-limited solution, such as those being proposed by PJM and SPP. Quarterly ERAS cycles through 2028 would likely have more impact on existing interconnection customers than a single targeted ERAS cycle. Small ERAS cycles are less likely to trigger violations that lead to required network upgrades than MISO’s standard interconnection cycles with 50GW or more each. We reiterate our request that MISO clarify how it will ensure that ERAS projects will pay the share of any required network upgrades that ERAS projects would have been responsible for had they been studied in the same clusters alongside other projects. 

Going forward, a separate ERAS interconnection process will in fact create two separate generation interconnection pathways, resulting in two classes of interconnecting generators. Considering the privileges with respect to timing for ERAS projects, and the privileges with respect to fees and penalties for ERAS projects, ERAS will advantage one set of interconnecting projects over the other. And considering the eligibility requirements (see above), MISO will be advantaging ERAS projects over regular interconnection projects if it proceeds without making substantial adjustments to this proposal, thus raising open access concerns. As MISO itself noted in its recent filing to FERC on generator interconnection queues, the Commission previously determined that prospective interconnection customers, i.e. new generators, that were part of a state-sponsored selection process could not receive priority queue access, and other interconnection applicants must be allowed to compete in the wholesale energy market on an equal footing.^[7]

We also note that ERAS may harm some states relative to others. We understand MISO is working with OMS and RERRAs to identify criteria or a process for RERRAs to identify generation projects that are required to meet resource adequacy needs. But states are differently situated. Some states have expressed that the ERAS process won’t fit with their IRP and other existing resource planning processes, including requirements for public notice, comment, etc. Thus, there is a potential that only certain jurisdictions would be able to utilize the ERAS process. This inability for some states to take advantage of ERAS could cause harm to generation needed by those states relative to states that can benefit from a rapid ERAS study. There is also a moral hazard here: states that have robust systems in place to ensure system reliability from their respective LSEs likely won’t need ERAS, whereas those without such processes will gain an advantage for their LSEs under the ERAS process. We request MISO also address how it will ensure that ERAS does not harm some states and RERRAs.

Coordination between ERAS, EPR, and DPP studies

In the December 16th OMS meeting, Andy Wittmeier suggested that MISO could combine the Expedited Project Review process with ERAS to fast track studies for new load and the generation to support that load. We are deeply concerned by that suggestion as well as the fact that MISO has not thoroughly wrestled with the interplay between ERAS and EPR, in particular. Increasingly, and MISO appears to be encouraging this, TOs are using EPRs to study network upgrades to support new, large loads. However, it does not appear that MISO is studying (nor requiring its TOs to conduct the necessary studies) or mitigating the impact the harm that EPRs may have on existing customers. Those harms include inability to ride through faults,^[8] exhaustion of regulation service,^[9] and many others.^[10]

In addition, if MISO fails to identify reliability issues until after the new load is interconnected, the transmission upgrades would be identified as typical transmission reliability upgrades so they would be “rate-based” rather than paid for by the interconnecting customer and the TO would presumably earn its FERC-approved ROE as well. This misalignment of interconnection costs between ERAS and non-ERAS projects, as well as the incentive any LSE has to build generation, lead to serious concerns about whether ERAS would be used for far more than the purpose for which it is proposed, causing unnecessary costs and complications for all interconnecting customers. In addition to causing a misalignment between the interconnection costs between ERAS and non-ERAS projects, this also leaves unresolved the issue of new large load that is driving the need for an ERAS project not being the same as the load that has to pay for such reliability upgrades. 

ERAS Timing

We reiterate our point in earlier comments that MISO’s proposed quarterly ERAS cycles are not a targeted approach to addressing any urgent resource adequacy need that may exist. One ERAS cycle, appropriately scheduled so that states and others have time to identify needed projects, should be sufficient prior to 2028. Also, one cycle outside of MISO’s current tariff defined interconnection process would align with proposals under consideration in PJM and SPP for one targeted cycle to allow rapid progress towards GIA for generators identified as needed for resource adequacy.

Other Issues

How does MISO intend to treat projects that work together as portfolios, e.g. batteries and renewables that are not colocated but which are part of the same proposal by an LSE or “other ICs, where applicable” to their respective RERRA?.

Finally, there are many other issues that stakeholders, including the Environmental Sector, raised following the first ERAS Workshop that were not addressed during the second Workshop. While we understand that MISO had limited time to review all that initial feedback prior to the second workshop, we believe that MISO should undertake a full review of submitted feedback rather than proposing changes based on only a limited review. We are also concerned about MISO’s restriction of feedback to only those changes in its proposal based on MISO’s incomplete review. This timing with respect to these feedback opportunities is restricting the ability of MISO’s stakeholder process to live up to the promise of FERC Order 719, which laid out the tenants of inclusiveness, fairness, minority representation, and responsiveness.  Additionally, MISO should clearly delineate any changes in its proposal prior to the next publication; the lack of such clear explication in MISO’s December 6th publication has complicated stakeholder efforts to respond.

MidAmerican appreciates the opportunity to provide comments to MISO on the Expedited Resources Adequacy Study Proposal presented on December 6, 2024. MidAmerican supports the ERAS Proposal as an alternative route to the MISO DPP process for needed resources to support load growth experienced by Load Serving Entities. While MidAmerican understands MISO has little control over affected system studies, we are concerned there will still be prolonged uncertainty with project costs from affected systems where such studies take significantly longer than the ERAS process. MISO’s work with SPP on the Joint Transmission Interconnection Queue projects is a good example of approaching this coordination problem in a new way and we encourage MISO to work with other affected systems on expedited study processes. MidAmerican is also participating in comments being submitted by the MISO Transmission Owners.

Duke appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback on this important issue.

Slides 6, 7 and 8 – Duke Energy would like for MISO to allow LSEs to move from the queue process to ERAS process penalty free if they do so within 6 months of MISO’s implementation of the ERAS process after FERC’s initial approval of ERAS process.  As proposed, the LSE is already paying a higher deposit for entering the ERAS and by withdrawing from the 2023 cycle benefits should flow to those who decide to stay in the 2023 cycle by reducing the volume to be studied. The ERAS process was created to improve the queue situation by giving the LSEs who are ready to move through the queue process and connect incremental generation to the grid a timely way to do so. Those that are the most ready would be those already included in the 2023 MISO queue. However, by requiring automatic withdraw penalties for leaving the traditional queue process and joining ERAS, MISO is disincentivizing the very activity it is trying to promote.  Duke Energy understands that if an entity exits both the traditional MISO queue process and then ALSO exits the ERAS process, that it may be appropriate to provide the queue automatic withdraw penalties at that time to discourage gaming of the two processes.  However, a grace period with no automatic withdraw penalty should be given for a short time after approval of the ERAS process for those LSEs in the 2023 queue that want to move to ERAS.  

Duke would also like to better understand the timing and risk associated with the affected system (AFS) study process.  How much time will the AFS studies take after the ERAS process concludes?  Could additional costs and upgrades be assessed after a GIA is issued under the ERAS process? Etc.  More clarity is desired on this point to determine the risk of moving forward without the AFS completed.

Steelhead continues to be concerned about comparability of assumptions between the existing DPP and the proposed ERAS studies. Differing assumptions between the two will propagate as varied study results, inconsistent network upgrades, and shifted cost allocation.

In the last round of feedback, MISO responded to differences in generation dispatch, saying:

“Generation would be different as the DPP would be performed as a study cycle cluster with all generation in that cycle and all earlier cycles still pending rather than in ERAS which would be done sequentially for each individual ERAS resource and only include generation with a GIA”

It would also appear that BPM-020 Section 3.3.3 is further constraining the online generation in the MTEP model with mostly NRIS-only:

“All existing generators are modeled and the generators that are not part of the Network Resources are modeled off-line unless required to meet public policy, such as renewable energy standards.”

This difference in online generation between the MTEP and DPP models is significant. The base case and contingent flows of transmission facilities will vary between the two studies. Overloads will not be consistent between the two. This may provide the new generators a cheaper path to interconnection through the ERAS process.

Due to different dispatches and flows, a generator interconnection request that would’ve impacted an overload in the DPP model may not see that facility overloaded in the MTEP model. Approving this generator interconnection request through the ERAS process would absolve it from its fair share of network upgrade cost allocation.

Our concern is exactly that – ERAS will exempt generators from sharing certain network upgrade costs that otherwise would’ve been observed and shared through the DPP process.

This reasoning extends across all study analyses – steady state, deliverability, local planning criteria, short circuit, and stability. With base models that do not have the same modeled generation, results will be different. ERAS provides a circumvention to the existing queue practices. We urge MISO to work on accelerating the current study processes to provide timely and accurate interconnection studies. If MISO can accelerate the study timelines, there is no need to introduce bypasses to the existing processes.

Consumers Energy submits the following limited feedback in response to new information provided during the December 6, 2024, workshop on the Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) proposal. 
In the 12/6 presentation, MISO noted that most stakeholders are open to both Option 1 and Option 2 regarding the proposed study timeline. Consumers Energy supports MISO’s proposal of a quarterly study process as described in Option 2.  In the response to feedback from the 11/18 workshop, MISO stated that it agrees that projects should get 3 years from the GIA rather than just 2 years as previously proposed. Consumers Energy reiterates the importance of and need for this additional extension and encourages MISO to keep this extended 3-year COD timeline requirement in final versions of the proposal. Consumers Energy also agrees with MISO that the existing PGIA process does not negate the need for ERAS as implied by some stakeholders during the workshop. One key difference is that the ERAS process will provide a path forward for both ERIS and NRIS service whereas the PGIA process does not address requests for NRIS. Consumers Energy continues to support MISO in the development of ERAS and believes this additional process will add more tools to the toolbox available to projects seeking to interconnect.

Finally, Consumers Energy reiterates its position that there must be clear criteria for “supporting resource adequacy” and what documentation will be needed to meet this designation.  Consumers Energy supports MISO’s work with OMS on this issue and encourages that MISO create a clear list of the necessary documentation with any final proposal. It will be essential to know what materials will be needed to obtain a resource adequacy designation when creating solicitations and planning for interconnection of projects. This should be a matter that is addressed directly in the tariff and not left to the business manuals as that will not provide LSEs the necessary guidance at the outset on whether the ERAS process will be the right avenue for a project. 

Entergy Feedback submitted to the requisite subject matter experts. Feedback is for public view. 

Comments of the Southern Renewable Energy Association

SREA provides the following comments regarding MISO’s latest presentation, which slightly modified their proposal to provide a fast lane process for interconnection requests that assist in meeting resource adequacy needs driven by load additions, resource retirements, or other expected system needs leading to a reserve margin gap in respective states throughout MISO. SREA reiterates that we do not support the ERAS proposal, but we respond with the following feedback to the presentation offered on December 6th 2024. 

While MISO stated in the ERAS proposal presentation on December 6th that ‘Load Serving Entities (LSEs) and other ICs, where applicable,’ can enter the ERAS process, MISO has not defined ‘where applicable’ for ‘other ICs’. MISO needs to explain the qualifying criteria applicable to ICs and LSE’s joining into the ERAS process, and how it will not be arbitrarily applied to determine participants and non-participants. Additionally, there is very little detail on what is required of state decision makers in order to qualify an interconnection request for participation in the ERAS process. This ambiguity can lead to unequal outcomes throughout MISO’s footprint which will limit the competitive development and deployment of resources in the competitive wholesale market. We urge MISO to provide clear guidance to states on criteria for projects qualifying for ERAS that can be applied throughout the footprint in a non-discriminatory manner. 

From a high level, as a trade association whose members are participating in MISO’s interconnection queue, we have the following concerns: 

1. Any proposal to create a parallel process should not result in de facto discrimination of resource types or developers that can fulfill resource adequacy requirements. MISO should also demonstrate upon filing of a proposal why the proposal is not leading to de facto discrimination of resource types or developers. 

2. MISO staff resources directed towards ERAS should not lead to further inefficiency in the already challenged regular DPP Cycles that are strained with processing over 330GW’s of resources marked ‘Active’ in the queue. 

3. Any proposal MISO brings forth for consideration at FERC does not inherently raise the cost of developing generation, resulting in harm to queue participants by creating greater exposure to network upgrades from the impacts of transmission capacity assigned in ERAS. 

SREA does not support MISO’s current proposal because we do not believe that it meets these standards. MISO has also not provided a statement of why ERAS is needed outside of a  resignation that the current DPP queue is not functional, that MISO does not know how to fix it, and therefore queue jumping should be allowed. We also would like to address the manner in which the ERAS proposal is being crafted. The fact that MISO has modified the ERAS proposal between workshops without a full review of stakeholder comments is discouraging. MISO’s process for developing this proposal should be after review of stakeholder feedback in order to respond to concerns raised by stakeholders, not before a full review of feedback. In that regard, we hope that a full review of stakeholder comments will be completed before the next scheduled stakeholder meeting that the ERAS proposal will be discussed at. 

Furthermore, this is the third queue reform being proposed by MISO in less than a year. While we understand the urgency of enabling resources to meet future demand, we also have concerns about initiating process changes without measuring the success of the commercial readiness reforms, the MW Cap proposal, and now the ERAS process. The impacts of these reforms should be considered before moving ahead with a parallel process through ERAS that considers impacts to the same transmission system modeled in the DPP. 

The following comments provided by SREA address the modifications to the proposal offered at the December 6th ERAS Workshop as well as some persistent concerns about the proposal overall. 

COD Extensions

Contrary to the theme of the ERAS proposal as an avenue to facilitating deliverable capacity in a more timely fashion than MISO’s standard DPP Cycles, MISO is suggesting that an extension of a Commercial Operations Date from 3-6 years is appropriate for ERAS. We oppose this extension proposal because there should be a guarantee that this capacity shows up in exchange for participation in ERAS. If these needs are urgent, the COD should be firm, and deliverable capacity expectations should not be within the range of 3-6 years, if it is to be considered expedited. This timeframe is closer to expectations for neighboring non-market regions like the Tennessee Valley Authority[1] which provides this timeline for their newly introduced cluster study process. 

SREA continues to be opposed to COD extensions for ERAS, because this does nothing to resolve supply chain challenges experienced by either TO’s or IC’s, which is a major factor delaying COD’s for projects that already have GIA’s in the MISO footprint. 

Withdrawal Penalties and Deposits

MISO is proposing to retain withdrawal penalties for projects in current DPP cycles that wish to be included in an ERAS cycle. While SREA understands the challenge in preventing restudies from potential late stage dropouts in DPP Cycles, we also feel the need to point out that it seems inherently unfair that any IC that has put up significant financial commitments in the form of deposits and milestone payments and spent considerable time in the queue, should be penalized for having their queue position usurped by an ERAS project. 

Broadly, this is an inherent flaw to the ERAS proposal, that queue jumping results in unfair treatment, because, while there may be good late stage candidate projects for ERAS in current DPP Cycles, they face a higher barrier to entry than new applications. A minimum baseline should be to require that M2 payments in the ERAS process are 100% at risk upon withdrawal of a project. Penalties assessed in the event of withdrawal could then be re-invested in DPP Cycles or could be utilized to reduce the costs of any “true-up” network upgrades. If the expectation is that ERAS projects are fulfilling an urgent resource adequacy need, and that these projects are highly credible from a commercial readiness standpoint, they should be held to a higher standard than the DPP Cycles, not a lower one.  

ERAS Impacts on DPP

SREA continues to share concerns raised by stakeholders about potential detrimental impacts that the ERAS process could have on the DPP Cycles progressing in parallel. SREA proposes that MISO provide a detailed written explanation or hypothetical examples of MISO’s theory on how interactions between the EPR, DPP, and ERAS processes will not result in detrimental impacts to the allocation of transmission capacity to, and allocation of costs to participants in DPP cycles. 

For a hypothetical, provides the following case in which two projects at the same substation in DPP 2023, one gas, and one solar project have unequal need for upgrades due to their participation in ERAS or the DPP. In this scenario: 

• July 2025 - EPR is approved at this substation for new load, building new transmission capacity

• August 2025 – Gas plant leaves DPP 2023 and joins ERAS

• ERAS GIA for the gas plant absorbs the full capacity created by the EPR

• The solar project however has new upgrades identified, because the ERAS project used the capacity created by the EPR

  • Without ERAS, maybe both projects would have benefited from the EPR

It would be helpful to stakeholders if MISO were to respond to this hypothetical.

Affected Systems Studies

MISO has excluded Affected Systems from the ERAS process proposal allowing for AFS after a GIA has been signed. It’s not inconceivable that this could lead to inaccurate costs being borne by ratepayers in the event that a project makes it GIA, receives regulatory approval, and then is allocated costs for upgrades identified in the AFS process. In addition to any costs being allocated, there are again implications to projects in the MISO DPP that could be impacted by transmission capacity being allocated to an ERAS participant. MISO should address this.  

Sunset of the ERAS Process

We do not support MISO’s proposal to sunset ERAS after a period of 3 years. This is a much longer period of time than the 1 year being proposed for SPP’s ERAS process, and the 1 year timeframe discussed for PJM’s intended resource adequacy related interconnection process. Furthermore, the statements provided by MISO that this process will be in place until MISO is able to meet DPP timelines in their Order 2023 compliance are too open-ended. Given historic challenges in MISO meeting DPP deadlines, even for smaller queues, the end date for the ERAS process should not be dependent on this criteria, especially if ERAS requires staff resources also dedicated to the DPP Cycles. We believe that if the ERAS process is to be implemented at all, that MISO should only implement it for 1 year.  

Projected Load Growth, GIA’s and Queued Projects

MISO currently has nearly 320GW’s of resources active in the interconnection queue, with 38GW’s of resources that are currently in GIA negotiations according to MISO’s most recent December DPP Study Cycle Schedule[2]. This is in addition to the often cited 57GW of resources[3] that have already signed GIA’s. This equates to 95GW of resources that are nearing GIA completion or already have a GIA. While a GIA is a necessary component of reaching commercial operation, it’s clearly not the largest barrier, and in this context it’s not clear why projects with ERAS GIA’s will not face similar challenges to reaching commercial operation. 

While there is a sense of capacity that can be enabled from capacity that has GIA’s, there is no sense of the scale, or location of this growth. This has implications for state reliability requirements, IRP planning, and whether a state is regulated or unregulated. Furthermore, there is the issue of how to treat a portfolio of projects proposed to meet a new commercial need. The announced META facility in Richland Parish, Louisiana[4] is seeking a mix of co-fired gas and hydrogen, and solar and storage resources, and the portfolio is likely to have deliverability constraints that are unique to each project. It is unclear if the solar and storage portion is related to resource adequacy needs for that facility specifically, or whether it is related to corporate sustainability goals and would be delivered to load elsewhere in the state. Regardless, under the current rules, the ERAS process would be undertaken before state approval of a portfolio of resources for new load, which would be pre-empting feedback from intervenors, and decisions from regulators in the state level docket. 

MISO should be providing guidance to states on these dimensions of the need - time, location, and volume, they are all important. Understanding that MISO is currently in the process of refreshing the Futures in 2025 to include load growth assumptions, these assumptions should be a part of stakeholder discussions around the ERAS proposal. We advise, assuming the need is not infinite, that projected load additions be used to administer a cap to the ERAS process as well. 

Additionally, the scoring of project viability could be an important element of an ERAS proposal that is present in CAISO’s and PJM’s proposals that can mitigate discrepancies between states and load zones that might otherwise consider differing criteria for ERAS candidate projects. States have a responsibility to maintain resource adequacy and resource selection, but it’s MISO’s responsibility to ensure open access, which provides a competitive pool of resources to meet resource adequacy needs.  

Moving forward with the proposal before there are assumptions about load growth in the Futures is encouraging a process that doesn’t have any concept of the scale of the resource adequacy gap, the capacity available, and how to enable capacity rather than issuing GIA’s. We urge MISO to increase the timeline for ERAS discussions to account for the findings of the Futures refresh planned for 2025, and additionally to work through stakeholder concerns in a cooperative manner.  

[1]http://www.oasis.oati.com/woa/docs/TVA/TVAdocs/IC_Meeting_-_Improvements_and_Order_2023_Update_-final(revised).pdf

[2] https://cdn.misoenergy.org/Definitive%20Planning%20Phase%20Schedule629192.pdf

[3]https://cdn.misoenergy.org/20241210%20System%20Planning%20Committee%20of%20the%20BOD%20Item%2004%20Generator%20Interconnection%20Queue%20Update665714.pdf

[4] https://www.entergynewsroom.com/news/entergy-louisiana-power-meta-s-data-center-in-richland-parish/

In response to the ERAS Study Proposal presented at the December 6^th workshop, the MISO Transmission Owners (Owners) have the following comments. 

The Owners continue to be supportive of MISO’s efforts to ensure the resource adequacy needs of its members are being addressed.  The Owners view the ERAS Study Proposal as a necessary and critical, reasonably time-bounded solution to forecasted capacity shortfalls.  To that end, the Owners agree that flexibility is needed in the documentation MISO will require from the state or local regulatory entity for a project to enter the ERAS process as there is diversity in rules and processes across the various jurisdictions within MISO.

Additionally, the Owners recognize the importance of regulatory entities’ needs to undertake their own review procedures.  MISO should confirm that the submission of the documentation from the regulatory entity does not require the regulatory entity to predetermine the outcome of the regulatory entity’s formal process to review and approve the resource.  By allowing a project to undergo concurrent study under the ERAS process in parallel with the regulatory approval process, MISO can further demonstrate its support for the regulatory entities’ formal processes.  

Regarding modeling updates for coordination of ERAS and DPP Network Upgrades, the Owners recommend ERAS generators and any Network Upgrades resulting from an executed GIA after completion of an ERAS process should be timely incorporated into the DPP study models at the next DPP phase of any active DPP study. With ERAS projects already in regulatory process, this would minimize the potential transmission overbuild or underbuild identified in the parallel DPP process and provide the Owners with valid and up-to-date justifications to move DPP Network Upgrades through the regulatory approval process when needed. Slide 9 of the workshop materials is a bit unclear on the modeling coordination and the Owners would appreciate further clarification.

Finally, it is also not very clear on how studies driven by Local Planning Criteria would be handled in the ERAS process and the Owners would appreciate further clarification on that as well.

            The Arkansas Public Service Commission (“APSC”) welcomes MISO’s efforts to accommodate state reliability needs and its receptivity to comments regarding its ERAS proposal, including MISO’s commitment to act with the OMS to determine the documentation a RERRA could provide to MISO identifying that a project is needed for maintaining resource adequacy.  The APSC supports the general intent of the ERAS proposal, with certain guardrails, as a needed process to ensure resource adequacy.    

The APSC thoughtfully offers that if the RERRA-related requirements do not accommodate the diversity of state laws, regulations, and processes, there is a risk that the ERAS process could exclude projects that need to be built within one or more of the MISO states. 

Further, although a simple attestation by the RERRA could be sufficient for a project to be recognized by MISO as supporting resource adequacy, the APSC does not believe that a single or uniform attestation is appropriate. To accommodate the myriad of state laws and regulations, MISO should be flexible in what it considers to be an attestation. For example, it should allow an order by the relevant RERRA granting a certificate to construct a generation facility to count as an attestation.  While the APSC acknowledges that MISO is intending for the ERAS process to run simultaneously with state certification processes, the APSC believes that its alternative could accommodate those RERRAs whose regulations may limit the applicability of ERAS. Therefore, to ensure maximum potential applicability to ensure resource adequacy, MISO should acknowledge that a “one size fits all” approach may not be usable for this process.

The APSC continues to encourage MISO to not automatically sunset the ERAS proposal.  The ERAS process should be tailored sufficiently to minimize the number of  projects which would be included and thereby not present an undue burden on the Generation Interconnection Queue study process.  Therefore, in the interests in maintaining options for RERRAs to meet their resource adequacy needs, the APSC would recommend that MISO not sunset ERAS.  If the Queue becomes sufficiently streamlined, it may not be necessary for ERAS to be utilized, but the future is never certain, and maintaining ERAS, even if unused, allows a safety valve which may be needed in the future.     

The APSC does not believe that the ERAS will be used often and does not believe that it should be used often.  It is a process of last resort, but one that is greatly needed.  As the only stakeholder responsible for resource adequacy in Arkansas, the APSC encourages MISO to continue its outreach to the RERRAs and looks forward to working toward a more refined proposal.

Invenergy Comments on December 6, 2024 Expedited Resource Adequacy Study Proposal

Invenergy appreciates this second opportunity to comment on MISO’s proposed Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (“ERAS”) concept. Unfortunately, MISO’s revised proposal, issued on December 6, 2024, does not change the fact that ERAS would violate open access, permit unlawful queue jumping, and harm DPP interconnection customers. The concerns identified by Invenergy in its first set of comments submitted on November 27, 2024, have not been resolved by MISO’s relatively minor changes to the ERAS proposal.

As Invenergy understands it, MISO proposed two material changes to its ERAS proposal at its December 6, 2024, workshop. First, MISO will permit developers that have contracted for offtake with a Load Serving Entity (LSE) to propose ERAS projects, and second, MISO will require projects withdrawing from the DPP process and entering ERAS to pay withdrawal penalties (while still not imposing withdrawal penalties on ERAS projects that withdraw from the queue). This tinkering does not allay our concerns that ERAS impermissibly “create[s] priority access to the generator interconnection process for [an] exempted classes of interconnection requests,” MISO, 186 FERC ¶ 61,054 at P 177, violates open access by preferencing certain LSE/RERRA-sponsored market participants, and harms DPP interconnection customers by using available headroom on the transmission system, thereby leaving those DPP interconnection customers to pay for Network Upgrades.  Nor has MISO demonstrated with data or any analysis that ERAS will actually resolve potential resource adequacy concerns. 

The Commission in Order Nos. 888 and 2003 sought to prevent the discriminatory treatment of competitive generation by requiring open access transmission tariffs that are not “unduly discriminatory or anticompetitive” and that “offer third parties access on the same or comparable basis, and under the same or comparable terms and conditions, as the transmission provider's uses of its system.”  Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,647.  MISO’s ERAS proposal would violate this fundamental principle by vesting load-serving, transmission owning entities with the authority to decide who can expeditiously interconnect and on what terms. ERAS does not include any protections to ensure that LSEs do not preference their own or affiliate generation. Rather than spend significant resources litigating this issue at FERC and on appeal, we respectfully suggest MISO reconsider its approach in favor of less discriminatory alternatives.

MISO’s ERAS Proposal Violates the Federal Power Act

The Federal Power Act requires the tariff to be just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.  The Commission’s open access transmission and interconnection policies implement this statutory mandate by ensuring that competitive markets allow all market participants to compete on an even playing field.  MISO’s proposal to grant a subset of market participants expedited interconnection clearly runs afoul of the Federal Power Act and well-established Commission policy. In fact, the Commission rejected MISO’s RERRA exemption from its original queue cap proposal because it created and preferenced a special class of interconnection customers. MISO’s ERAS proposal suffers from the same defect.

The fact that MISO proposes to only let LSEs, and those contracting with LSEs, qualify for ERAS both violates open access and is unduly discriminatory. The Commission has repeatedly sought to prevent LSEs from gatekeeping the interconnection queue and access to the grid. Letting LSEs handpick which projects can participate in ERAS clearly runs afoul of these goals and preferences LSEs at everyone else’s expense. If MISO wants to adopt expedited interconnection procedures, it must do so without regard to whether an LSE has selected or contracted with a counterparty.

MISO’s proposal to permit independent power producers with LSE offtake agreements to apply for ERAS also does not mitigate these concerns. Most if not all offtake arrangements occur after Phase 2 DPP studies are complete because that is the point at which an offtaker (such as an LSE) can reasonably assess project viability. This creates a Catch-22: independent power producers cannot generally get offtake from an LSE until after Phase 2 DPP is complete, but MISO’s proposal would only permit a project to drop from DPP into ERAS before Phase 2 has commenced. In fact, DPP customers that drop out of the queue after DPP Phase 2 must still pay withdrawal penalties and wait at least a year before entering ERAS, by which point the ERAS process will nearly have sunset. As such, it will nearly be impossible for independent power producers to avail themselves of ERAS.

MISO’s proposal is discriminatory for other reasons as well. Rather than permitting “access [to the grid] on the same or comparable basis, and under the same or comparable terms and conditions,” ERAS would let LSE-sponsored market participants get an interconnection agreement in 4 months while non-ERAS projects will get an interconnection agreement in 3-4 years.  And for some reason, MISO has determined that ERAS projects will not incur withdrawal penalties if they withdraw from the queue while DPP interconnection customers will.  This type of arbitrary preferential treatment is what open access rules are intended to prevent.

MISO’s deference to states and RERRAs as to what constitutes resource adequacy is also unjust, unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory.  As MISO appears to concede, states and RERRAs within MISO have different perspectives on resource adequacy. Further, each state has different oversight over RERRAs, leading to conflicts and delays in determining which LSEs are subject to which RERRA.  MISO has not explained how its proposal will address these variances and inevitably lead to uneven implementation of ERAS on a state-by-state basis.

ERAS Harms Existing Interconnection Customers

Despite MISO’s protestations to the contrary, ERAS will inevitably harm projects in the DPP interconnection queue by increasing network upgrade costs and exacerbating queue delays.  As proposed, ERAS projects will enter an interconnection queue, be studied, and issued a generator interconnection agreement before customers currently in DPP 2023 (who entered the queue before ERAS was even an idea) will be studied.  This is queue jumping, which FERC routinely rejects, because of its deleterious impact on the queue-jumped projects.

Multiple stakeholders at both the November 18 and December 6 workshops raised concerns that ERAS projects will use existing headroom on the transmission system, thereby delaying the interconnection of DPP projects and causing them to incur additional network upgrades.  MISO’s response – that DPP and ERAS use different base cases—misses the point. If you add new ERAS projects to the grid before currently-queued projects, less transmission capacity will be available for the DPP projects.  If MISO believes it can disprove this immutable fact, it should issue a white paper explaining exactly how MISO intends to run parallel interconnection studies without negatively impacting DPP customers. It should also explain how network upgrade costs incurred by ERAS projects, and those network upgrades resulting from ERAS’ projects use of transmission headroom, will be identified and paid for.

Finally, despite of recent queue reforms and MW cap filing, which MISO has not demonstrated the impact, MISO readily acknowledges that interconnection delays are already common, but it has not explained how its proposal to add another study process will not increase these delays. Commission precedent is clear that the Commission will reject proposals to establish multiple interconnection study processes if they are likely to harm the standard interconnection queue. MISO has thus far failed to satisfy this burden.

MISO Has Not Demonstrated That ERAS Will Solve Its Resource Adequacy Concerns

MISO justifies its ERAS proposal by arguing that expediting the interconnection studies for a handful of preferred projects is necessary to maintain resource adequacy.  MISO ERAS Introduction, PAC-2023-1 (November 13, 2024).  But getting a signed GIA does not bring projects online.  In fact, MISO conceded in its December 10, 2024 interconnection update to the Board of Directors System Planning Committee that two of the main impediments to achieving commercial operation are transmission-owner delays and supply chain constraints. Neither of these are addressed by MISO’s proposal. Furthermore, ERAS interconnection studies will not include a study of affected systems, which still need to be done (and affected system upgrades built) before an ERAS project can interconnect. MISO also proposes to study ERAS projects before such projects have even been approved as part of a state planning proceeding, which begs the question of whether the projects will even be built.  Given these facts and that MISO has not provided any analysis as to the resource adequacy impact of the ERAS proposal, MISO has not demonstrated that its proposal will achieve its intended aims.

Resource Adequacy Needs Can be Met in Other Ways

If MISO’s goal is to solve near-term resource adequacy needs, it should pursue those measures that will both have the greatest impact and can be implemented consistent with the Federal Power Act.  Generator replacement, provisional interconnection, and uprates to existing facilities are all existing measures that can support resource adequacy without creating an entirely new and discriminatory process.

Invenergy would be happy to engage with MISO and other stakeholders about how these processes can be used to meet MISO’s near-term goals and what changes, if any, can further improve their efficacy. For example, MISO allows generators to obtain provisional interconnection service, however the existing tariff does not allow such generation to qualify as a Capacity Resource.  Removing the barrier to utilize provisional interconnection service in MISO could prove an effective means of adding qualified accredited capacity to the system in the next 3-5 years.  Additionally, allowing merchant high-voltage direct current (“HVDC”) transmission lines limited operation would increase system reliability and help alleviate resource adequacy concerns.  HVDC transmission lines provide significant regional flexibility, bring available generation to load, and allow neighboring generation to flow into MISO when needed.

MISO Must Eliminate Opportunities for Undue Discrimination and Harm to Others Should It Continue With ERAS

Given these numerous concerns, Invenergy encourages MISO to abandon ERAS in favor of more efficient and less discriminatory solutions.  ERAS will be highly contested at FERC and the courts, further undermining any purported short-term benefits.  Should MISO nonetheless continue with ERAS, the proposal must be changed to eliminate opportunities for undue discrimination and to hold customers in the DPP interconnection queue harmless.  Invenergy offers the following ideas and welcomes robust stakeholder engagement on these points.

• ERAS projects must request and maintain 100% NRIS to ensure applicable network upgrades are identified and built to improve the reliability of the transmission system.
• ERAS generation may not use LSE’s NITS or firm PTP Transmission Service to meet deliverability requirements.
• All ERAS associated deposits and payments, including towards the ERAS network upgrades, are to be forfeited upon withdrawal from ERAS and redistributed to the DPP cluster the ERAS project withdrew from.
• Without fully understanding the resource adequacy concerns driving MISO’s proposal, it is difficult for stakeholders to address solutions.  MISO must provide stakeholders the necessary information underlying its concerns.  Further, LSEs and RERRAs should not be the gatekeepers for which projects are eligible for ERAS.  While it is difficult to offer solutions without understanding the problem, MISO could, for example, work with stakeholders in considering whether to develop neutral scoring criteria applicable to all interconnection customers that might be interested in pursuing expedited interconnection.
• More generally, if MISO is concerned about resource adequacy, it should work with stakeholders to comprehensively address the issue.  If data centers are a driving concern, MISO should engage with stakeholders about whether to develop a framework for co-located generation to serve load. 
• DPP interconnection customers must not pay increased network upgrade costs that would otherwise not exist but for the addition of ERAS projects. 

Expedited Resource Adequacy Study Proposal
MISO Dashboard ID#: PAC-2023-1
January 6, 2025

On December 6, 2024, MISO held a second workshop to discuss its proposed Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) Proposal and requested feedback on the presentation. NextEra Energy Resources (NextEra) provides this additional feedback on MISO’s proposal and urges MISO to take this into consideration as it reviews stakeholder feedback. As previously noted, NextEra has serious concerns about addressing the current backlogged queue through a proposal that discriminates against certain entities and that is likely to have significant negative impacts on projects in the existing queue. Accordingly, NextEra urges MISO to consider the following:

1. Instead of creating a new fast-track process, MISO should be focused on making progress on resolving the problems with its existing queue to get those resources online as soon as possible so they can satisfy resource adequacy needs.
   1. MISO should give its 2023/24 queue reforms and automation efforts the opportunity to take effect and positively impact the process.
   2. MISO should increase staffing resources if needed to process studies more quickly and accurately.
   3. MISO should first evaluate projects currently in the queue to determine whether any projects can meet MISO’s resource adequacy needs; those projects may be more constructable, come online faster, and be more cost effective than those sourced from LSEs through a new process.

2. Any alternative proposal to the existing queue, like the ERAS proposal, must not have negative impacts on projects in the existing queue by:
   1. Diverting staff resources causing further delays.
   2. Taking transmission capacity and increasing network upgrade costs for projects in the existing queue.
   3. Causing restudies due to withdrawals of projects to join the ERAS queue causing further delays.

3. If MISO moves forward with this proposal, ERAS must have appropriate guardrails by being very targeted and limited in size and scope.  The ERAS process should only be utilized where MISO:

1. 1. Evaluates and determines independently that there is a demonstrated and specific RA shortfall from an LSE in a specific location that is not already a “known” RA shortfall (i.e., should address new large load additions only),
   2. Confirms there are no projects in the existing queue that can meet that demonstrated and specific need,
   3. Validates that ERAS projects have the ability to actually meet the demonstrated and specific need on the required timeline without extensions.

4. In addition, the following changes must be made to the ERAS proposal:
   1. ERAS must be open to LSEs and IPPs to get the best projects online.  Making the process exclusive to LSEs is unduly discriminatory and will ignore projects that may be more constructible and lower cost. 
   2. ERAS should be a one-time process and limited in size to the amount of projects in each region tied to a demonstrated reliability need that cannot be met with the current pipeline of resources in the queue.
   3. Projects must have expected COD in 3 years; no waiver for COD extension permitted.
   4. MISO should establish objective criteria for qualification into ERAS and utilize a points system to rank projects by:
      1. Project viability: Points awarded for permit applications in place or underway, expansion of an existing generating facility, low network upgrade costs (estimate can be done using Pearl Street)
      2. System need:  Points awarded based on project capacity accreditation 
      3. Commercial interest: Points awarded based on fraction of project with contracted offtake to LSE or non-LSE (Form could be a term sheet/statement of intent if too early in process to have formal contract); limitation on percentage that LSE can contract with affiliates
   5. Projects must be subject to criteria that is more stringent than criteria for the existing queue, reflecting the priority treatment that the ERAS queue will receive.
      1. 100% site control
      2. 100% NRIS
      3. Higher application fee, milestone and study deposits
      4. All payments are forfeited by withdrawal, and withdrawn projects may not re-enter their existing queue cycle.  It is discriminatory for ERAS projects to have no withdrawal penalties. 

NextEra appreciates the opportunity to provide these additional comments.

Pine Gate appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback on the December 6 ERAS workshop.  We support MISO’s update regarding DPP transfers to ERAS.  We agree that any transfers should be limited to early-queued projects and subject to withdrawal penalties.  Otherwise, late-stage withdrawals will trigger additional DPP restudies, which will delay the transition to the one-year study process. However, we continue to share the concerns raised by other developers that the current proposal is unduly discriminatory to IPPs, harms DPP projects, and is not targeted enough to limit ERAS to shovel-ready projects that meet immediate reliability needs.  Details on each state's acknowledgement/approval processes are needed to potentially address these concerns.

DESRI Renewables (DESRI) appreciates the opportunity to comment on MISO’s Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) proposal, most recently presented on December 6, 2024. While DESRI understands MISO’s desire to address its resource adequacy concerns, we have significant concerns about aspects of the proposal which appear to be unduly discriminatory or preferential, potentially undermining the fairness of the interconnection process. Specifically, we are concerned that the ERAS proposal:

1. Disadvantages existing projects in the Generator Interconnection Queue (GIQ) process and biases the process in favor of certain entities;
2. Includes provisions that risk deviating from established principles of just and reasonable open access; and
3. May not fully leverage or could sideline other effective tools available to MISO to meet its goals.

Impacts on Current GIQ Efficiency and Additional Workload

MISO should provide guardrails to ensure the ERAS process does not create further delays in the existing GIQ.

DESRI is concerned that the ERAS process will not only exacerbate existing delays but also degrade the quality and efficiency of the main GIQ due to increased workload on MISO’s already strained resources. Interconnection study delays have many sources, but over 10 DPP cycles cite “MISO Delays” as the reason for delay, according to the December 3, 2024 IPWG DPP Study Schedule Updates. Furthermore, the additional administrative work and coordination for ERAS projects may disproportionately affect independent power producers (IPPs) by shifting key resources away from their projects, and by exacerbating resource adequacy deficiencies by preventing the timely addition of resources currently in the queue.

DESRI appreciates MISO’s clarification on December 6, 2024, that projects withdrawing from DPP 2023 will be subject to all existing penalties and harm calculations as outlined in the Tariff. However, the ongoing impacts to study schedules is a paramount concern.

To ensure the ERAS process does not compromise the integrity or quality of the current interconnection queue, DESRI strongly encourages MISO to implement robust safeguards and management strategies to prevent additional GIQ delays. These should include enhanced staffing and resource allocation to manage the additional workload without undermining ongoing GIQ processes; clear scheduling priorities that prevent ERAS projects from sidelining existing queue projects; and regular audits to assess the impact of ERAS on GIQ timelines and quality.

DESRI insists on transparency and accountability in how these safeguards are implemented and monitored to ensure they effectively mitigate risks associated with the ERAS process.

MISO Should Provide More Details on how Non-LSEs can Participate in ERAS

At their December 6, 2024, meeting, MISO indicated the potential for Interconnection Customers other than LSEs to participate in ERAS “where applicable.” However, DESRI seeks more explicit details on the eligibility and procedural processes to ensure these are clear, inclusive, and non-discriminatory. The current ERAS framework appears to potentially exclude IPPs which would lead to discriminatory practices. To prevent unduly preferential treatment in favor of LSE-owned projects, DESRI strongly recommends that the eligibility criteria explicitly include projects owned by IPPs, whether contracted with LSEs or shortlisted in a solicitation for contracts with an LSE. Additionally, DESRI suggests that MISO provides specific guidelines on how these criteria apply across different types of interconnection customers to ensure fair and equal open access to the ERAS process.

State Approval and Parallel Processing

The variability introduced by multiple state regulations adds a significant layer of complexity and potential for unfairness in the ERAS process. To address this, a more structured and transparent approval process is essential, one that fully integrates non-discriminatory principles to ensure all projects are evaluated equitably across different jurisdictions. DESRI is concerned that the parallel state approval process, while intended to expedite the process, could inadvertently grant undue advantages to certain projects, particularly those owned by LSEs that are proceeding through the ERAS process. This parallel processing could potentially influence state decisions in resource selections, giving LSE-owned projects preferential treatment in the selection process.

Further, projects should be required to obtain their Certificate of Public Convenience and Need (CPCN) or equivalent before entering the ERAS process. This requirement ensures that only viable, well-prepared, and necessary projects participate in ERAS, preventing speculative or premature entries.

To mitigate the risks of inconsistent state processes and potential LSE bias, the parallel approval process should be utilized as long as it establishes just and reasonable standards and prevents discriminatory or preferential treatment across the states. This process should outline more stringent and consistent requirements across states, which can help reduce the variability or uncertainty from state to state. This alignment should ensure that no projects—regardless of a state’s expedited or prolonged approval processes—gain an undue advantage. MISO can help mitigate timing uncertainty and ensure a more level playing field for ERAS participants by implementing a more rigid and synchronized approach between states through the parallel process.

Components of ERAS Undermine its Intended Goals

MISO’s November 21, 2024, filing at FERC in Docket ER25-507 proposes a cap on the megawatt (MW) value of interconnection requests included in a cluster to improve queue processing efficiency and reduce the number of speculative projects. Per the November 21 filing, “stringent GIP requirements are insufficient to deter Interconnection Customers from introducing speculative and unready projects into the queue.” However, MISO has not applied a similar cap to the ERAs process and should explain why it believes these dynamics won’t also occur in the ERAS queue. This inconsistency raises concerns about potential delays and backlogs in the ERAS process, as unrestricted MW entries could overburden the system, contradicting MISO’s own efficiency goals. MISO should justify the absence of a similar cap in the ERAS process and consider implementing one based on regional resource adequacy needs to prevent unnecessary system costs and maintain processing efficiency. We note for reference SPP’s December 18 proposal to establish a ceiling on capacity eligibility based on an LSEs load projections.

Additionally, ERAS is intended to meet near-term resource adequacy needs, but we are concerned that it lacks strict Commercial Operation Date (COD) deadlines for project completion. Projects should only be able to benefit from expedited study through ERAS if they can come online soon enough to support the resource adequacy need. If a project isn’t certain about its ability to reach commercial operations within the next five years, it should not be able to jump in the queue to participate in a process intended to meet resource adequacy needs in that timeframe. MISO should impose penalties or terminate interconnection agreements for ERAS projects that fail to achieve commercial operation within five years of the ERAS study kickoff.

ERASs Could Enable Certain Projects to Benefit from Transmission Capacity that would have Otherwise Accrued to Projects in the GIQ

DESRI appreciates MISO’s clarification on the timing of ERAS studies and transmission model development. However, DESRI is concerned that LSEs will be able to take advantage of new transmission capacity created by Expedited Project Review projects, whereas without ERAS, that new transmission capacity would benefit projects currently in the queue.

MISO has seen significant growth in Expedited Project Review transmission projects, many of which are necessary to safely accommodate large load customers. DESRI is concerned that LSEs could deploy their ERAS project applications such that only ERAS projects will be able utilize capacity from new EPR transmission infrastructure. Such an outcome would harm projects currently in the DPP process. DESRI advocates for guardrails to prevent LSEs from gaming the transmission system to the detriment of other interconnection customers.

MISO Should Improve Existing Tools to Meet Resource Adequacy

If MISO faces a short-term resource adequacy need, it should enhance processes that quickly provide resource adequacy benefits, such as surplus or replacement generation. Contrary to MISO’s current assertions that ‘Surplus and Replacement are derivative products of an already established GIA, and may increase the accreditation at a point of interconnection but does not add additional interconnection service to serve new load,’ we contend that this view significantly underestimates the potential benefits of these resources. Surplus generation, while not adding new interconnection service, plays a critical role in bolstering grid reliability during peak demand periods and assists LSEs in maintaining necessary reserve margins.

Surplus and replacement generation interconnection processes enable new capacity to complete studies within a year, offering an efficient solution for short-term reliability needs. Surplus resources avoid extensive network upgrades, offering a cost-effective alternative that leverages existing infrastructure to enhance reliability, unlike the ERAS process where network upgrade costs are uncertain and expose ratepayers to uncapped costs.

Despite the clear advantages of surplus and replacement generation, these tools remain underutilized within MISO’s current framework. DESRI recommends MISO actively collaborate with stakeholders to identify and remove existing barriers to the effective use of surplus generation, before implementing new and untested processes, like ERAS, which allow certain resources to jump the established queue.

Conclusion

DESRI appreciates the opportunity to provide this feedback. We remain concerned that ERAS could undermine open access principles, potentially proving to be unjust and unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory and preferential. Additionally, we are troubled by the speed at which this proposal is being rushed through the stakeholder process and urge MISO to allow for more comprehensive stakeholder input and engagement before any tariff revisions are filed with FERC.

Clean Grid Alliance Comments on ERAS Study Proposal (PAC 2023-1)  
Jan 6, 2025

Clean Grid Alliance appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the MISO ERAS study proposal updates:

• MISO’s original ERAS proposal was introduced on November 18th. Its first revision to the proposal (issued on December 6, 2024), does not address the many issues around ERAS violating open access 
  
  
• MISO’s proposal is extremely rushed and should have gone through the standard required stakeholder process. ERAS was first introduced to stakeholders in November 2024 and does not fit within the scope of item PAC 2023-1 it was put under 
  
  
• MISO’s revised ERAS proposal lacks an explanation of how staff resources will be allocated by MISO to ensure existing projects in the queue are not unduly harmed
  
  
• MISO’s revised ERAS proposal harms DPP interconnection customers by using available headroom on the transmission system, leaving the original DPP interconnection customers to pay for unpredictable Network Upgrade costs
  
  
• MISO’s revised ERAS proposal does not include any protections to ensure LSEs do not preference their own affiliate generation
  
  
• MISO has not clarified if ERAS projects that apply prior to the DPP 2025 kick off will need to be studied serially before DPP 2025 can kick off. 
  
  
• MISO has not clarified why an ERAS project prior to DPP 2025 allowed to withdraw and create harm to projects in DPP-2025 should not be subject to standard DPP harm provisions
  
  
• MISO has not put into ERAS requirements that ERAS projects will be subjected to the JTIQ provisions, including the JTIQ screening to determine whether a JTIQ Funding Agreement will be required
  
  
• For ERAS projects, all M2 should be at risk 
  
  
• MISO should set standardized quantification/documentation requirements to capture the capacity needs of RERRAs
  
  
• MISO should clearly document in any filing, the scoring criteria for inclusion of projects in the ERAS queue, including how/why those criteria are fair to all projects, regardless of fuel source

We encourage MISO to take this feedback into genuine consideration. 

Sincerely,

Rhonda R. Peters, Ph.D.
Technical Consultant for Clean Grid

NG Renewables appreciates the opportunity to comment on this issue but also notes that the last iteration of stakeholder feedback was not reviewed at the most recent meeting on ERAS, nor is it clear what changes were made based on stakeholder feedback. It would be helpful if MISO were to summarize key feedback items it received and how that feedback changed the proposal, as is customary practice in many MISO committees. NG Renewables offers the following additional feedback on the proposal, keeping in mind that MISO has requested only new feedback, but also notes our previous feedback to MISO has not been addressed outright.

Overview

Prior to engaging in any issue solving initiative the problem should be clearly defined. If the region is experiencing resource adequacy concerns, the market is not incenting the development of the resources needed to address potential shortcomings. Providing inappropriate queue priorities will not solve the issue of neither the markets nor make MISO more able to process multiple queues in a timely manner. MISO proposes no criteria to prioritize these resources, and if this lack of prioritization leads to ERAS resources that are only economic due to out of market revenues (e.g., rate base cost recovery) then that raises a whole distinct set of issues that are beyond these comments.  NGR posits if the solution should focus on market or resource adequacy solutions rather than tangential queue hierarchies.

ERAS does not address the problems it is intended to solve.

It became clear in MISOs most recent presentation and discussion that MISO is attempting to address a resource adequacy shortfall while simultaneously declining to consider how ERAS will improve resource adequacy. MISO should provide insight into and opportunity for discussion around how a resource adequacy shortfall will be measured, how ERAS resources will be sufficient to meet that need, and how the resource adequacy problem might be considered solved. NG Renewables is eager to work with MISO to find a solution and is not against the concept of assessing project viability and reliability in general. However, MISO has noted that a discussion of any metrics for to improve resource adequacy are out of the scope of discussion. While NG Renewables understands that it can be prudent to, as MISO noted, “focus on what (they) can control,” providing metrics for resource adequacy is within MISOs control, and should be considered. MISO should engage in this discussion at ERAS workshops, and where appropriate, in other subcommittees where additional MISO staff and stakeholders with expertise in resource adequacy might have the opportunity to contribute to a solution.

Additionally, NG Renewables notes that there are several aspects of ERAS that are not conducive to solving a short-term resource adequacy crisis and offers the following feedback on those points. MISO has proposed the ERAS process to remedy a short-term resource adequacy need. Therefore, ERAS projects should be capped at the scale of the resource adequacy shortfall by area. Specifically, MISO should assess the amount of accredited ZRCs that each LRE or zone is deficient and cap projects on an accredited MW basis based on that deficiency. By using accredited value (a resource adequacy metric), MISO will be more well-targeted to solve a resource adequacy problem. This deficiency should be based on the most recent data available. This would also address some other stakeholders' concerns over the magnitude of actual shortfall.

MISO also stated that several entities support a dynamic ERAS timeline, which could be shortened or lengthened. NG Renewables believes that ERAS should have a pre-set, time limited duration of under 3 years. This timeline is more appropriate to address a short-term resource adequacy concern. Extending the timeline would not be consistent with the stated intent of ERAS. ERAS does not currently have any MISO-vetted criteria for project submission, so NG Renewables also believes that FERC may also express discrimination concerns over ERAS if it is a long-term proposal.

As it was not printed in the most recent presentation, NG Renewables will also reiterate that parallel studies create a high, almost certain risk of double counting transmission headroom, not a minor risk as MISO mentioned verbally. NG Renewables is concerned that an entirely parallel study will absolutely cause issues of double counting headroom and will create real time reliability problems.

MISO has not justified why current options to address RA issues cannot be used.

            NG Renewables will re-iterate that the provisional GIA process could be used to bring generation resources online more quickly. While these resources will be subject to more risk, this is similar to the administratively created risks such as increased financial deposits that MISO is proposing as part of the ERAS proposal. MISO has not explained or justified why the provisional GIA process could not be used. NG Renewables notes that an established, non-discriminatory process would in fact be a more expeditious process to bring generators online rather than an entirely new process that would require FERC approval and staff resource allocation.

NG Renewables also notes that MISO retains the ability to delay retirements for reliability. While there are concerns over the cost impact to rate base customers of these actions, NG Renewables points out that a short-term, delayed retirement would have a lesser impact on end-use customers than a new generation resource. For example, running a sub-optimal gas or coal generator for the 2–3-year timeline suggested by MISO for ERAS would be far less expensive than the construction and 50-year operation of a new coal or gas generator.

The ERAS timeline is exceptionally and inappropriately short given the magnitude of changes proposed.

NG Renewables looks forward to further discussion on this topic and will continue to encourage MISO to extend the timeline on this issue to longer than an effective 3 months stretched over the holiday season. This is neither enough time for MISO to adequately solicit stakeholder feedback for an enormous change to the interconnection platform, nor enough time for states to prepare for the significant burden MISO is asking them to shoulder by forfeiting the RTO obligation to provide resource adequacy metrics for generation within the footprint. MISO has also recently filed a significant change to its interconnection queue (the Queue Cap) that it has asserted will resolve many of the timing issues with the queue. The full impact of this change should be assessed for at least one queue cycle before it is determined ineffective.

The OMS Transmission Planning Work Group and Resources Work Group (OMS Work Groups) provide this feedback to MISO on its Expedited Resource Adequacy Study (ERAS) proposal. This feedback is from OMS work groups and does not represent a position of the OMS Board of Directors.

The OMS Work Groups appreciate MISO’s exploration of an alternative process to bring generation resources online that may be needed to meet emerging resource adequacy needs. OMS continues (on an accelerated schedule) to discuss how the ERAS process as currently proposed could work with existing state processes and what explicit guardrails may be necessary to ensure it can withstand regulatory scrutiny and potential legal challenges.

The OMS Work Groups stress that ERAS should not distract or supplant MISO’s efforts to improve its existing generation interconnection queue and that the same urgency MISO has applied to developing ERAS should be applied to shortening the GIQ study time to one year. The OMS Work Groups agree with MISO that the ERAS process must be a temporary solution. ERAS must be directly tied to making improvements to the interconnection queue and reducing processing time, which is the primary and preferred method to achieve long-term resource adequacy. The OMS Work Groups’ support for ERAS will be contingent on its temporal nature and connection to queue improvements.

At this time, early input indicates that most if not all OMS members believe a workable path likely exists for ERAS. States are willing to work with MISO to determine what modifications to MISO’s proposal may be necessary to achieve broad support and to ensure a high degree of compatibility with existing state laws and processes. However, the accelerated development of MISO’s proposal and targeted filing date may lead to rejection by FERC or may unnecessarily expose state and local retail regulators to legal challenges.

There appear to be areas of the proposal that need additional information or transparency from MISO to ensure that the proposal is properly understood by those agreeing to the framework, including but not limited to: alignment with the affected systems study process, DPP cluster vs. ERAS serial study implications, RERRA and MISO notification procedures, among others. Additional time (2-4 weeks) for stakeholder feedback, understanding, and input is likely required – in addition to time needed for states to ensure that buy-in and approvals from a necessary and broader set of state personnel is obtained. The OMS Work Groups do not believe this timeframe would impact any schedule or needs MISO has articulated, and we do appreciate the need to file this proposal in the first quarter of 2025 to give time for FERC decision making and to make the process available this year.

The OMS Work Groups advise that OMS support for the final ERAS proposal will likely require sufficient guardrails, protections, requirements, and assurances (and potentially further reporting from MISO to document) that include but are not limited to: improving the existing queue will remain the focus and priority of MISO; ensuring the time-limited nature of ERAS (OMS members are varied in their support for the proposed duration of ERAS); clear identification of the ‘special circumstance’ need for ERAS and that the proposal is a stop-gap measure; firm commitment that the proposal is fuel neutral; and any extension of ERAS would require reapproval and significant substantiation.

The OMS Work Groups will review the feedback from other stakeholders to identify any novel issues, concerns, or potential pathways forward and will provide more comprehensive feedback to MISO as soon as possible.