In the July 17, 2024, meeting of the Planning Advisory Committee (PAC), MISO presented draft BPM-015 language for Definition of an Error for purposes of Automatic Withdrawal Penalties. Stakeholders were invited to submit feedback.
Comments are due August 2.
Qcells USA (Qcells) appreciates the opportunity to provide comment on this matter. Qcells views MISO's proposed error definition as flawed and requests that MISO reconsider its approach. The proposed definition puts the onus on the Interconnection Customer to identify MISO errors leading to withdrawal. Additionally, it would cause Interconnection Customers to carry unnecessary financial burdens that are of no fault of their own. Qcells encourages MISO to be proactive in identifying and correcting errors. Qcells believes that MISO should strive to fix errors in the phase in which they are identified. If MISO is not able to address an error within the phase it was identified, it should not burden the Interconnection Customer with the cost of the error moving into the next phase or while the error is being addressed.
These comments are submitted on behalf of the Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA). SEIA thanks MISO for the opportunity to comment on MISO’s presented “Definition of an Error” for purposes of Automatic Withdrawal Penalties (PAC-2023-1). SEIA encourages MISO to redraft the proposed language that would qualify an Interconnection Customer (“IC”) for an Automatic Withdrawal Penalty exemption.
SEIA agrees with MISO that errors beyond the control of the IC should result in waiver of automatic withdrawal penalties. SEIA further agrees that MISO correctly identified three types of errors related to modeling the system, the applicant’s facility, and generation dispatch as reasonable categories.
However, MISO’s requirement that the IC identify the error for MISO creates an unreasonable burden for an IC to identify any MISO error during the study phase they are in. This specific, narrow timeline increases the financial risk of withdrawal prior to MISO’s confirmation and mitigation of the error by requiring ICs to post milestones payments before knowing the outcome of studies related to identified errors. Further, it places the entire burden of identifying and documenting an error on the IC. MISO and TOs are in the best position to identify errors in their own transmission studies. MISO's language does not require MISO to respond to the IC or correct the error in the current DPP cycle even if the publication of study results is months away.
MISO's proposal incorrectly assumes that ICs are incentivized to hold errors and report them at later dates. There is no evidence of such behavior in the DPP process today and no IC wishes to be provided with inaccurate study results. ICs seek cost certainty. As such, ICs are incentivized to notify and seek rectification of any error that may affect their interconnection costs and timing as soon as they are identified.
Though MISO’s Generator Interconnection Procedures filing, Docket ER24-340-000, diligently contemplated when Automatic Withdrawal Penalties would apply, milestone payments could be refunded, and when MISO or Transmission Owner errors would protect ICs from unexpected Network Upgrade cost increases, MISO chose not to define an error in their Tariff filing. In fact, FERC’s Order on the matter points to MISO’s assertion that ICs would be able to withdraw an interconnection request, penalty free, in the event of a MISO error:
"MISO clarifies that it does not intend to apply the Automatic Withdrawal Penalty to penalty-free withdrawal scenarios involving cost increases that are due to an error by MISO, the transmission owner, or an affected system owner." (FERC's January 19, 2024, Order Accepting MISO's Proposed Tariff Revisions Under ER24340-000, p. 31, Paragraph 76.)
As such, FERC and MISO’s stakeholders were led to believe MISO’s practices related to Network Upgrade Cost Increases due to MISO and TO errors would remain the same throughout MISO’s Generator Interconnection reform. MISO’s present proposal to change the rules and procedures related to MISO errors through a BPM edit, especially in such a way that so significantly affects ICs, is improper, unjust, unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory.
Furthermore, SEIA highlights that under MISO’s proposal, MISO can provide widely inaccurate study results due to a qualifying MISO error, require the IC to post millions of dollars in Milestone Payments, provide the next study more than 1-year later, leave the error uncorrected, and then provide the IC with the opportunity to withdraw “penalty free.” This is after the IC posted additional credit, wore the costs associated with maintaining that credit posting, and waited in the queue for multiple years. The IC is not provided with a reasonable path forward, MISO is not required to reimburse the IC for the additional credit posting costs, and the project is left with an uncertain future. In SEIA’s view, this scenario is unlikely but entirely possible. SEIA encourages MISO to provide ICs with exemptions from the Automatic Withdrawal Penalties if the study results at any phase are published and the network upgrades costs are based on a qualifying error.
The Environmental Sector appreciates the opportunity to provide feedback regarding GI Queue Improvements. As presented at the Planning Advisory Committee on July 17, 2024, the proposed Business Practice Manual (BPM) changes update the definition of an “error” to include incorrect representation of topology in the MISO footprint, incorrect representation of an Interconnection Request in the MISO footprint, or incorrect implementation of generation dispatch. MISO notes that these sorts of errors “must also have gone uncorrected in a subsequent DPP phase or restudy and caused an increase to the project’s Network Upgrade cost.” This pertains to already withdrawn projects in a given cycle, but it does not acknowledge that an uncorrected error may have impacts on projects in later cycles. MISO should clarify why it is appropriate to only allow penalty free withdrawal for already withdrawn projects impacted by these errors, but not those that may be impacted by errors in a subsequent cycle or cycles, if errors go uncorrected. As another matter, MISO is not acknowledging that there may be errors related to the three criteria MISO provided on slide 4 of the July 17th presentation that arise in Affected Systems Studies (AFS) as well. If these errors arise in AFS and cause the drop out of a project, it should not be treated differently than errors found elsewhere in the study, and they should qualify for penalty free withdrawal as well. The Environmental Sector encourages MISO to reassess this proposal to address the above concerns. Longer term, we urge review of the implementation of these changes within the next five years, to assess whether they are fair to interconnection customers that cannot carry a project forward due to errors in the interconnection process, and do not place undue financial risk on developers.
Re: Orsted Onshore North America (Ørsted) Feedback on July 17, 2024 Presentation on BPM – 015 Definition of Error
Please accept the following comments in response to the presentation at the July 17, 2024 Planning Committee clarifying the definition of error for purposes of section 7.6.2.4 of the Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT). The section indicates that Milestone payments will be refunded to the Interconnection Customer as a result of Transmission Provider, or Transmission Owner error. This section appropriately recognizes that errors beyond the control of the Interconnection Customer should result in waiver of Automatic Withdrawal Penalty. Specifically, in Slide 4 of the presentation, MISO proposes that:
“For the purposes of Automatic Withdrawal Penalty, an error is any of the following confirmed through documented correspondence with MISO staff during the study phase in which the error was introduced:
The error must also have gone uncorrected in a subsequent DPP phase or restudy and caused an increase to the project’s Network Upgrade cost. The error definition is only relevant for withdrawn Interconnection Requests.”
Ørsted has concerns with the last two sentence of this proposal. First, it appears that the Interconnection Customer is responsible for identifying the errors for MISO. This would create an unreasonable burden for the Interconnection Customer as MISO and Transmission Owner are in the best position to identify errors in their own transmission studies. Second, the penalty free withdrawal would only apply to withdrawn interconnection requests. This proposal does not address the impact on projects that are in the queue and that are also impacted by the error. Thus, as proposed, it appears that generators are being penalized for errors that are not corrected from one study period to the next. To address this issue, MISO should remove this requirement. If MISO does not remove the requirement, then additional clarification is needed as why this proposed is needed and the implications for projects in the queue. In addition, the error language does not appear to apply to Affected System Studies. MISO should clarify whether this language applies to Affected System Studies and if not, why not.
Though its interconnection reforms, MISO has placed increasing responsibilities on Interconnection Customers. Ørsted appreciates that MISO clarified in its filing to the Commission that it did not intend to apply the Automatic Withdrawal Penalty to penalty-free withdrawal scenarios involving cost increases that are due to an error by MISO, the transmission owner, or an affected system owner. In order to make ensure that Interconnection Customers are not unduly affected by errors, MISO should ensure customer in the queue are not penalized for study errors and that the language applies to all applicable studies.
Respectfully Submitted,
Lopa Parikh, Head of Electricity Policy, Ørsted